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Structural and Psychological Perspectives 
on the Perpetrator of Genocide
ROXANA MARIN 
”Any broad historical examination of the phenomenon of genocide 
cannot fruitfully proceed without engagement with issues of collective 
human psychopathology.”
      MARK LEVENE1
”Understanding genocide requires probing the minds of those who 
commit it, and those who seek to prevent or limit it.” 
     ADAM JONES2
There is a statutory contention that violence and killing is some sort of irreducible 
mark of the human being, an inseparable trait encrypted within the human nature. 
Interhumane violence is a biblical manifestation, Elie Wiesel would sententiously 
argue about one of the introductory scenes of the Bible whose protagonists are brothers 
Cain and Abel: ”Two men [and] one of them became a killer”3. From the slaughter of 
Abel to mass killings the Holy Book of Judeo-Christian tradition counts only several 
pages. Inspiringly, Chirot would cite from it, when illustrating the episode of the 
extermination of the Midianites by the Israelites led by Moses: 
”[The Lord said:] ’Avenge the people of Israel on the Midianites […].’ And 
Moses said to the people, ’Arm men from among you for the war, that they may 
go against Midian, to execute the Lord’s vengeance […].’ They warred against 
Midian, as the Lord commanded Moses, and slew every male […] And the people 
of Israel took captive the women of Midian and their little ones; and they took 
as booty all their cattle, their flocks, and all their goods. All their cities […] they 
burned with fire […] And Moses was angry with the officers of the army […] 
[He] said to them, ’Have you let all the women live ? Behold, these caused the 
people of Israel, by the counsel of Balaam, to act treacherously against the Lord 
in the matter of Pe’or, and so the plague came to the congregations of the Lord. 
Now, therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman who 
has known man by lying with him. But all the young girls who have not known 
man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves’”4.
1 Mark LEVENE, The Meaning of Genocide, Volume 1: Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, 
I.B. Tauris, London & New York, 2005, p. 130.
2 Adam JONES, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 383.
3 Elie WIESEL apud Lance MORROW, ”Evil”, Time Magazine, on the 10th of June 1991, 
p. 48.
4 Numbers 31:3 apud Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All. The Logic 
and Prevention of Mass Political Murder, Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey) & 
Oxford (UK), 2006, pp. 29-30 [adds in original]. 
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Nevertheless, among countless irrefutable proofs that violence is historically 
part of the human nature, homo violens1 reached his climax only in the 20th century 
– a veritable ”Age of Genocide”2 –, along with what Bauman and Arendt referred 
to differently as some sort of alienation of the modern life, a bureaucratic dementia 
and the development of a killing-designed technology. The statistics, exposing the 
abnormal magnitude of killings perpetuated during modern history, display a picture 
of aberration and terrifying human disaster: 
 ”Wars erupt naturally everywhere humans are present. Since the Napoleonic 
Wars, we have fought an average of six international wars and six civil wars per 
decade. The four decades after the end of World War II saw 150 wars and only 26 
days of world peace – and that does not even include the innumerable internal 
wars and police actions. Buried in the midst of all of our progress in the twentieth 
century are well over a hundred million persons who met a violent death at the 
hands of their fellow human beings. That is over five times the number from 
the nineteenth century and more than ten times the number from the eighteenth 
century”3.
Waller further insists that the debut of total wars, those 20th century world 
conflagrations to be waged regardless of the medium and against whatever population 
each of this medium contained, either military or civilian population, marked the 
coming of some ”inhumanity age” in human history: 
 ”The persistence of inhumanity in human affairs is incontrovertible. The 
greatest catastrophes occur when the distinctions between war and crime 
fade; when there is dissolution of the boundary between military and criminal 
conduct, between civility and barbarity; when political and social groups 
embrace mass killing and genocide as warfare […] As collectives, engaged in 
acts of extraordinary evil, with apparent moral calm and intensity of supposed 
purpose, which could only be described as insane were they committed by an 
individual”4.
While the collocation ”war crime” is peculiar indeed to the murderous 
atmosphere of the last century, as a new form of perpetrating mass killings, it 
1 Roger DADOUN, La violence: essai sur l’ ’homo violens’, Hatier, Paris, 1993.
2 The phrase ”age of genocide” attributed to the past century is found in Roger W. SMITH, 
”Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an Age of Genocide”, in Isidor 
WALLIMANN, Michael N. DOBKOWSKI (eds.), Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case 
Studies of Mass Death, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse (New York), 2000, pp. 21-40/p. 21 
(initially published in 1987, by Greenwood Press, Westport (Connecticut)).
3 James WALLER, ”Perpetrators of Genocide: An Explanatory Model of Extraordinary 
Human Evil”, in IDEM, Children of Cain: How Ordinary People Commit Extraordinary Evil, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2001, p. 5 [italics in original]. Waller draws, in the construction of 
this appalling statistics, from Arthur H. WESTING, ”Research Communication: War as a Human 
Endeavour: The High-Fatality Wars of the Twentieth Century”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 19, 
no. 3, September 1982, pp. 261-270, and William ECKHARDT, ”War-Related Deaths Since 3000 
B.C.”, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 22, no. 4, December 1991, pp. 437-443. 
4 James WALLER, ”Perpetrators of Genocide…cit.”, p. 6.
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seems yet unadvisable to treat the diverse species of ”mass political murder”1 
as ”inhuman”: since these recurrent species were perpetrated by man alone and 
appear dissimilar to any other version of killing developed within the vast animal 
regna, it is a simple matter of semantic confusion the perspective on genocide and 
other related mass political murders as ”inhuman”. They are all but ”inhuman”. It 
might be argued that mass political killing is a facet of human speciesism, by no 
means inhuman. If one endeavors in understanding such occurrences, one of the 
preliminary steps is particularly to refute their alleged ”inhuman” nature. Otherwise, 
understanding becomes inaccessible to the human mind, as long as it appears as 
inhuman, unconceivable and unimaginable. Since ”people are the weapons by which 
genocide occurs”2, a discussion on perpetrators of massive violent occurrences in 
recent history is instrumental in devising a partial, lacunary explanatory scheme for 
generic mass criminal violence in the 20th century. Sociological, economic, political, 
cultural-anthropological, but most frequently psychological accounts on the status of 
perpetrator filled tomes of literature; the central question remained the one linked 
to the motivations and reasoning behind the abject actions of both leadership and 
ordinary individuals: how come people commit such reprehensible acts against their 
fellow citizens ? Regardless of the extension of the scientific work, the large majority 
of the studies on the motivational background of genocidal perpetrator is based on 
presuppositions, ideal types, assumptions, since, as Benjamin Valentino has aptly 
pointed out: 
 ”[U]nfortunately, direct evidence of the personal beliefs and motives of such 
persons is exceedingly rare. Perpetrators seldom record their inner thoughts 
and feelings about their deeds. Outside observers are rarely in a position to 
provide personal information of this kind. Moreover, the few existing accounts 
from perpetrators are of questionable reliability, since perpetrators usually have 
strong incentives to diminish their personal responsibility for any atrocities and 
portray their actions in the best possible light”3.
The large majority of this vast and comprehensive compendium tends to distinguish 
perpetrators based on a three-layered classification, sometimes associated with a 
subsequent gradation of responsibility: (a) the leadership or the ”higher echelons”, 
responsible for the design of the entire mechanism behind the killings (from sporadic, 
sometimes inconsistent ideology to fully-fledged policy), the bearers of ”big decisions” 
in the terrible process of mass murder; (b) the bureaucrats, the ”middle echelons”, the 
representatives of Arendt’s ”banality of evil”, usually ”faceless” and ”anonymous”, the 
1 ”Mass political murder” is an umbrella term employed by Daniel CHIROT and Clark 
McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., p. 12: ”extreme examples of attempts by a politically 
dominant group, typically claiming to represent a majority of the people in a given political 
entity, to get rid of specific ethnic or racial groups viewed as enemies”.
2 James WALLER, ”Perpetrators of Genocide…cit.”, p. 7.
3 Benjamin A. VALENTINO, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth 
Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York) & London, 2004, p. 39. Valentino 
distinguishes between two processes transforming individuals into perpetrators: (1) ”the 
concerted recruitment or self-selection of sadistic or fanatic individuals into the organizations 
responsible for mass killing”, and (2) ”situational pressures […] to induce otherwise ordinary 
human being to participate in acts of extreme violence”.
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simple followers of orders coming from the top of the infamous hierarchy, and (c) the 
ordinary men, the ”lower/lowest echelons” involved in the practical implementation 
of orders, the killers per se, more frequently outside the military structures – therefore, 
not soldiers, trained and licensed to kill during wartime. While often high-ranked 
killers are difficult to be spotted – because often a written and clear order is missing 
–, the ordinary killers are easier to spot, though collective guilt is more often than 
not the fashion in which they are dealt with: the ”structural (system) criminality”1. 
Historian Tim Mason fundamentally discriminates between two conceptions – later to 
become traditions – on the allegedly paradigmatic case of the Holocaust, two schools 
of thought that might be extended to the entire corollary of violent ethnic cleansing 
and genocide of the 20th century: (1) ”intentionalists” and (2) ”functionalists”2. 
The scholarly scientific divide is clearly distinguishable: the ”intentionalist” camp 
contends that, for the specific case of the Holocaust, one can identify a clear, direct and 
comprehensive association between a mobilizing and energizing ideology and careful 
planning at the top, accompanied by subsequent policy-making. In this construction, 
the central role is occupied by the chief perpetrator, the Fuehrer, who emanates both 
ideological debilitations and decision-making, acting as a coherent glue for the two. As 
expected, the functionalist stance is antagonistic, arguing that a serious, overreaching 
connection between ideology as a basis for genocide and policy as an implementation 
of the said cannot actually be established and accounted for. Friedländer explains the 
complexities put forward by the functionalists within the logic of the genocide: 
 ”It holds that decisions are functionally linked to each other and to a given 
state of the political context, that through the constant interaction of various semi-
autonomous agencies the role of the supreme decision-maker may sometimes be 
quite limited, and that his decisions often take on the aspect of planned policy 
only from the vantage of hindsight”3.
The mechanisms espoused by the functionalist perspective seem to coincide 
with the multi-layered decision-making scheme devised in the case of most recent 
genocides. From this standpoint, the most significant aspect that suffers serious 
1 Alette SMEULERS, ”Punishing the Enemies of All Mankind. Review Essay to Mark A. 
DRUMBL, Atrocity, Punishiment, and International Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 21, no. 4, December 2008, pp. 971-993.
2 A first distinction is made by Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, ”De l’Antisémitisme à l’Extermination. 
Esquisse historiographique”, Le Débat, vol. 21, no. 4, September 1982, pp. 131-150 
(later to be included as ”De l’Antisémitisme à l’Extermination. Esquisse historiographique et 
essai d’interprétation”, in François FURET (ed.), L’Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif, EHESS-
Gallimard-Le Seuil, Paris, 1985, pp. 13-38, translated in English in 1989, by Schocken Books in 
New York, as Unanswered Questions). Friedländer differentiates between ”those historians who 
stress the continuity of Nazi policies” [i.e. the ”intentionalists”] and ”those who place the accent 
on their discontinuous character” [i.e. the ”functionalists”]. However, Mason is the historian 
to consecrate the ”intentionalist” – ”functionalist” distinction (Tim MASON, ”Intention And 
Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National-Socialism”, in Gerhard 
HIRSCHFELD, Lothar KETTENACKER (eds.), Der Führerstaat, Mythos und Realität. Studien zur 
Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 23-41).
3 Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, ”From Anti-Semitism to Extermination: A Historiographical 
Study of Nazi Policies Toward the Jews and an Essay in Interpretation”, Yad Vashem Studies, 
vol. 16, 1984, pp. 1-50/p. 17.
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transformations in interpretation is the planned character of those attempts to 
exterminate or annihilate a certain minority group: in Rwanda, though the planned 
nature seemed obvious from the prior issuance of lists with Tutsi houses by the state 
officials, the local initiative and the overwhelming popular contribution to the killings 
are illustrative in contending that decision-making was by no means a top-down 
practice. In the Balkans, the tradition of a strong statism might lead to the conclusion 
that an intentionalist explanation proves its instrumentality in the case of the Sarajevo 
siege and Srebrenica. Nevertheless, one should not exclusively associate the validity 
of an intentionalist stance with genocides occurring during wartime: the complicated 
puzzle of the genocide in Bassarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria perpetrated against 
the Jewish population during the Second World War appears as a mixture of both 
intentionalist and functionalist interpretations. Though orders from the high military 
echelons did exist, the initiative and the innovation in conducting genocidal acts 
were left in the hands of the lower ranks. The same holds true for the local violence 
unleashed within the communities, until then fairly peaceful, comprising significant 
proportions of the targeted group.
Therefore, an inquiry into the motivational stimuli of the genocide perpetrators 
ought to shed some light on the representations of the ”Other”. Regardless of the 
fashion in which the killer unleashes his anger or frustration, in which the aggression is 
carried on, the motivations are channeled and oriented against an opposable group, a 
human collectivity that bears distinctive features, different or incompatible with those 
of the perpetrators. This is partly so: for instance, the literature1 has addressed the 
problem of difference in the case of Tutsis and Hutus, who were presumably different 
in terms of physical appearance (Tutsis being allegedly tall and thin, while Hutus being 
shorter and rounder); actually, they were virtually undistinguishable after centuries of 
mixed marriages and communal living – speaking the same language and practicing 
the same religion – and, consequently, preparatory steps (identification by identity 
cards, by a preliminary survey of Tutsi houses, by denunciation by neighbors or close 
friends, etc.) were taken by the perpetrators to ensure the spotting of the victims prior 
to April 62. Nevertheless, the manner in which the ”other” is conceived and perceived 
by the perpetrator is illuminating in identifying the motivations behind the decision 
to kill. Group tensions are seen to escalate, and once the motivational interplay is 
actuated, the path towards mass political murder based on group differentiation 
is paved. Historical experience has taught, it seems that only when the ”the other” 
is represented as possessing those characteristics – either physical (racial, gender), 
social, religious, economic or political – that are seen as clearly incompatible with the 
attributes of the dominant group embarked on murderous undertakings, the latter 
is actually going on the road of genocide. As Chirot and McCauley aptly put it, ”the 
fear of pollution”3 is tightly associated with the representations of the ”otherness”: 
in this logic, one can understand the insistence on racial or ethnic ”purity” of the 
(ideological) perpetrator, for instance.
1 See, Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., p. 89.
2 Famously, Gérard Prunier coins the two Rwandan groups, employing Weberian 
vocabulary, as two ”status groups”, i.e. groups that are distinguishable by their position on the 
socio-political hierarchy. Prunier’s book is virtually the standard reference when discussing 
the origins and development of the Rwandan genocide. (Gérard PRUNIER, The Rwanda Crisis: 
History of a Genocide, Colombia University Press, New York, 1997.)
3 Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., pp. 36-44. 
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In the intentionalist vein, one of the most appealed-to lines of argumentation 
is what has been convincingly labeled by German sociologist Theodor W. Adorno 
as ”the authoritarian personality”1, associating the central image of the leader and 
its propelled ideology to some sort of mass psychology of fascination towards the 
fascist desiderata. Similar roads have been taken by Wilhelm Reich2 and Erich Fromm3, 
who constructed entire explanatory models in which the individual is physically 
and mentally damaged as a resultant of an extreme paternal authoritarianism and 
repressive behavior and his own deviant and brutal adult behavior is the reflection 
of terrible childhood experience and the expression of a form of law of compensation 
or psychological projection, in which the psychologically bruised individual reedits 
the childhood suffering on other humans, marked by either a sense of ”hysterical 
narcissism” or a lack of self-esteem. Profoundly entrenched into this psychological 
or socio-psychological perspective, Adam Jones, for instance, identifies four central 
elements in triggering and motivating murderous acts: (1) narcissism, (2) greed, 
(3) fear, and (4) humiliation. The most potent mobilizing and motivating element 
remains, nonetheless, the fear: 
 ”Greed reflects objective material circumstances, but also, like narcissism, 
the core strivings of ego. Greed is never satiated; but when it is fed, one feels 
validated, successful – even omnipotent. Perhaps the only force that can truly 
match it as a motivator for genocide is fear”4.
Hence, while greed can be assimilated into a ”materialistic” or ”careerist”, 
more pragmatic killer in Mann’s classification, and narcissism acts as psychological 
catalyst, the veritable sentiment that leads more easily in turning an ordinary person 
into a perpetrator is fear. Quoting Burke, Jones will conclude that, eventually, ”[n]o 
power so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear”5. 
The postulate has its contingencies in practice: while reasoning might be indeed 
blurred and paralyzed by fear, action is not: under the impulse of fear, the would-be 
perpetrator is willing to engage in a sort of ”preemptive strike” towards his perceived 
enemy. Jones stresses on two forms of largely complementary human fear: (1) ”mortal 
terror” (or ”animal fear”, close to simple reflect gesture, i.e. the rather ”animal” 
response to an actually existing or perceived imminent threat to ”physical survival 
and integrity”; N.B. exacerbated at humans, for the very reason they have the ability 
of foreseeing dangers easily) and (2) ”existential dread” (i.e. a feeling presupposing a 
1 Theodor W. ADORNO, Else FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, Daniel J. LEVINSON, R. Nevitt 
SANFORD, The Authoritarian Personality, Harper, New York, 1950.
2 Wilhelm REICH, Character Analysis, transl. by Theodore P. Wolfe, Orgone Institute Press, 
New York, 1933; IDEM, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, transl. by Vincent. R. Carfagno, Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1970. 
3 Erich Seligmann FROMM, Escape from Freedom, Farrar & Rinehart, London & New York, 
1941; IDEM, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud, Holt and Rinehart, 
New York, 1962. Both Reich and Fromm put forward radical psychological (rather psychiatric) 
interpretations of the fascist phenomenon and the Holocaust and its perpetrators.
4 Adam JONES, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 389.
5 Edmund BURKE, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful (Part II. ii), ed. by James T. Boulton, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 57 (initially published 
in 1757).
241
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 2 • 2012
Structural and Psychological Perspectives on the Perpetrator of Genocide 
significant degree of personal identity, destiny, mission, ”social place”, and, therefore, 
bringing forth shame, increased frustration, dishonor, humiliation, in the presence of 
a perceived threat).
In his renowned The Dark Side of Democracy1, Michael Mann presents surely one 
of the most comprehensive multilayered, multifaceted typologies of the perpetrator, 
so close to exhaustiveness in his approach. Employing various criteria and founding 
on previous categorizations, the American scholar distinguishes between the 
commonsensical dichotomy ”whole ethnic groups” vs. ”state elites” and the threefold 
distinction ”elites” – ”militants” – ”core constituencies”. Based on these simplest 
differentiations, Mann constructs a complex typological scheme that discusses the 
diversity of perpetrators of mass killing, from ordinary people, variously motivated, to 
fanatics, bearing intrinsic rationality for the importance of their acts, from ”authoritarian 
elites” to ”nationalist masses”, going beyond the classical, rational choice theory-
inspired, distinction among ”rational”, ”emotional” and ”normative” perpetrators. 
Following Stanley Milgrams’s persuasive study2, Mann identifies nine motives that 
1 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 18-30.
2 Milgram is famous for having conducted a series of experiments in the mid-1970s – 
the so-called ”Milgram obedience experiments” – in which he isolated the importance of 
”authority” and ”obedience” in determining the individual to infringe physical suffering on 
the other. Concretely, the subject-individual takes part in a ”learning experiment”, allegedly 
helping the experimenter in the learning process of another subject, a ”confederate” in the 
”learner”’s role. In the experiment, the subject is asked – rather instructed – by the experimenter 
to play the role of the ”teacher”, i.e. the one who asks questions and gives an electric shock for 
each wrong answer, increasing the shock level for each successive wrong answer, successively 
from 15 to 450 volts (close to a fatale shock). Since the ”learner” is repeatedly mistaken, the 
”teacher” (the selected subject), following the instructions of the experimenter, goes along 
with the experiment to the point in which the ”learner” shows visible signs of physical injury. 
The results of the experiments demonstrate that up to two thirds of the subjects were willing 
to cause serious injuries to the ”learner” by increasing shock levels, being motivated by the 
external pressure exerted by and under the ”authorization” of the experimenter, perceived 
as a responsible expert. Milgram experiments are an application of both ”authorization” and 
”cognitive theory” for the study of the motivational drive of the genocide perpetrator. See 
Stanley MILGRAM, Obedience to Authority, Harper and Row, New York, 1974, and Thomas 
BLASS, ”The Milgram Paradigm after 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know about Obedience 
to Authority”, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, vol. 29, no. 5, May 1999, pp. 955-978. 
Milgram’s experiments on human capabilities to unleash violence against its peers are by 
no means singular. Philip Zimbardo, teaching at Stanford University, experimented similarly 
on his students who played the role of prison guards and prisoners (August 1971). As the 
experiment went on, the students, experiencing a process of ”deindividuation”, entered their 
roles so fully – displaying mind-blowing passiveness, in the case of the prisoners and sadistic 
tendencies, in the case of the guards – that Zimbardo was obliged to stop the experiment. 
His leading observations refer to the identification of three types of behavior in the case of 
perpetrators (the guards): (1) ”cruel and uncompromising” behavior, proving both imagination 
in humiliating and torturing the victim (prisoner) and pleasure in putting into practice the 
results of that imagination, the zealous, enthusiastic perpetrators, the ”volunteer-perpetrator”; 
(2) ”strict but fair” behavior, limited to enforcing the rules and orders received, without any 
”imaginative” additions, the ”follow-my-leader” type of perpetrator; (3) ”good” behavior, 
restraining from brutality and even trying to help the ones supervised, the ”reluctant 
perpetrator”, the perpetrator of resistance. Zimbardo’s results are discussed and applied in 
Ordinary Men, for the typology of perpetrators in the German police in Battalion 101. See, 
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would transform individuals and various societal strata into perpetrators of genocide-
like acts; nine motives are to produce nine types of perpetrators: (1) ”ideological 
killers”, (2) ”bigoted (or disgusted) killers”, (3) ”violent killers”, (4) ”fearful killers”, 
(5) ”careerist killers”, (6) ”materialist killers”, (7) ”disciplined killers”, (8) ”comradely 
killers”, and (9) ”bureaucratic killers”, i.e. what Arendt would coined the exponents of 
the ”banality of evil”. Chirot and McCauley would favor a rather simpler framework, 
inspired by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn1 and comprising only a fourfold, though 
almost exhaustive, motivational scheme: (1) ”convenience”, (2) ”revenge”, (3) ”simple 
fear” and (4) ”fear of pollution”. Although at least two of the four motivational stimuli 
tend to intermingle in order to eventually generate the criminal action against the 
distinct ”Other”, the identification of four major justifications to perpetuate what 
the two scholars coined as generic ”mass political murder” is exact and is to express 
fully the portrait of the perpetrator: either opportunistic or submissive, weak and 
materialistic, or vengeful, either scared, frightful or pathologically xenophobic, the 
killer in Mann’s extensive typology always finds his motivation in at least one of 
Chirot’ and McCauley’s fourfold discrimination. More psychologically inclined studies 
explaining the perpetrator’s behavior converge into the point of the ”neutralization 
theory”, i.e. a conception that seeks to account for the killer’s conduct by arguing 
that the killer finds ways of constructing the situation and the setting of his crime 
in such a manner that his internal, long-acquired, normative value system generally 
impeding crime, is neutralized. Any normative, axiological obstacle is removed with 
the support of five types of psychological mechanisms: (1) ”denial of responsibility”, 
(2) ”denial of injury”, (3) ”denial of victim”, (4) ”condemnation of the condemners”, 
and (5) ”appeal to higher loyalties”2. As opposed to a posteriori rationalizations, 
neutralization happens prior to the crime itself, making possible the criminal act at 
the psychological level, making it humanly bearable, by excluding any axiological, 
moral barrier in the preparation of the act. But excluding axiological limitations in 
the eve of the crime cannot exhaustively justify the participation in the criminal act 
or the criminal act itself. Rather, it is the ”crime of obedience”3 an ordinary man is 
capable of that might explain the commitment to a crime against the other. A ”crime of 
obedience” is to be facilitated by three subsequently acting factors: (1) ”authorization”, 
(2) ”routinization”, and (3) ”dehumanization”. If the term ”dehumanization” is 
highly contested, since killing is by no means an inhuman action, but rather an act 
characterizing human nature tout court, the concept of ”authorization” refers to the 
context in which an ordinary individual is commanded by authority to perpetuate 
crimes against ”the other” and he does so by reference to some sort of a ”license to kill” 
for instance, Philip George ZIMBARDO, Craig HANEY, W. Curtis BANKS, ”Interpersonal 
Dynamics in A Simulated Prison”, International Journal of Criminology and Penology, vol. 1, no. 1, 
March 1973, pp. 69-97. 
1 Frank CHALK, Kurt JONASSOHN, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and 
Case Studies, Yale University Press, New Haven (Connecticut), 1990, pp. 29-32.
2 Gresham McCREADY SYKES, David MATZA, ”Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory 
of Delinquency”, American Sociological Review, vol. 22, no. 6, December 1957, pp. 664-670; IDEM, 
”Delinquency and Subterranean Values”, American Sociological Review, vol. 26, no. 5, October 
1961, pp. 712-719; David MATZA, Delinquency and Drift, Wiley, New York, 1964.
3 The collocation is employed by Herbert C. KELMAN and V. Lee HAMILTON, in their 
Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility, Yale University 
Press, New Haven (Connecticut), 1989.
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granted by the statist authorities. Receiving and respecting orders have generically 
a major mobilizing impact on the individual; moreover, the fear of authority and 
how the authority can punish disloyalty towards it have the effect of wiping out any 
remorse or inner moral reservation an individual can still preserve. Nevertheless, 
authorization bears a feeble ability of justifying perpetrator’s acts. Routinization 
comes as a complementary and partial response, as well: the individual becomes 
immune to the normative impediments of his criminal undertakings once he acquired 
a sort of routine, some form of customary cold-heartedness: ”malum quo, communius eo 
peius”. One dilemma remains, as best expressed, once again, by Chirot: 
 ”How do feelings get hardened ? How is it that so many can be found to 
commit mass murder? What are the psychological mechanisms that overcome 
the horror most people feel when confronted by such spectacles ?”1.
Moreover, while for some perpetrators, routinization acts as a preventing factor 
for any sense of horror and disgust, for hampering any feeling of guilt, for those 
perpetrators transformed from ”ordinary people into butchers”, routinization can 
explain even less than authorization might explain. Routinization has the capacity of 
desensitizing the killers, but this is particularly so either in the case of state officials or 
of extremely brutal killers. Since perpetrating genocide or other forms of mass murder 
is not necessarily a remarkably violent, bloody occurrence, routinized bureaucrats 
can perform successfully the function of a crude killer. In addition, in spite of alleged 
routinization, the decision-makers undertaking genocidal measures gradually 
renounced to those initial mass shootings at close range – a method which would 
necessitate the direct, face-to-face contact between the killer and his victim – in favor 
of more impersonal, indirect, less bloody, rather ”chemical” or ”scientific” methods. 
The soldier-killer was slowly replaced by the technocratic killer, the scientific killer. 
A resurrection of the ”soldier-killer” was to be seen during the Yugoslav Wars of the 
1990s: with the practice of systematic rape as means to ethnic cleansing, the perceived 
drive towards the perpetuation of genocidal acts through impersonal, bureaucratic or 
technological fashions, registered a lapse in the last decade of the century, the contact 
between the perpetrator and his victim being once more essential for genocide to 
occur. Similarly, in Rwanda, the Hutus used machetes extensively in annihilating 
around 800 000 Tutsi in an impressive period of time (April 6-mid-July 1994), while 
systematic rape being perpetrated as well.
The ”intellectual perpetrator” occupies a rather privileged place in this scheme. 
Generally, he provides the ideological, i.e. intellectual, foundations for justifying and 
rationalizing subsequent acts of violence of what Mann labels the ”violent perpetrator” 
against the targeted enemy. One could include Charles Darwin’s evolutionist theory 
or Auguste Comte’s positivist sociology among the intellectual basis underpinning 
the fascist ideology to emerge some decades afterwards and to provide the setting 
and the climate for the genocide against the Jewish population. Mann, moreover, sees 
incipient fascist elements even in Rousseau’s ”volonté générale”, by further assessing 
and concluding that democracy itself bears the seeds of genocide for it presupposes 
the constitution of majorities in opposition to minorities, the first element in the 
outburst of political mass killing. Though his contentions might be perceived as far-
1 Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., p. 51.
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sided, based exclusively on a minimalist, rather philosophical, understanding of 
democracy1, the problem of intellectual bases for genocidal acts remains central to 
the discussion on the perpetrator’s image. Most probably, the phrasing ”intellectual 
perpetrator” is hazardous, especially fragments from the oeuvres of great thinkers are 
isolated and reinterpreted just to fit the purpose of a subliminal, intrinsic genocidal 
manifesto. Even so, the role of ideologues is worth surveying, since ideology is often 
designed to mobilize and energize the apathetic or confused masses, to offer the 
necessary rationalization, a set of ideas to which ordinary people resonate, for whom 
killing makes sense and is ultimately considered indispensable to the survival and 
future development of a certain dominant group. In this sense, one can distinguish 
between two types of (happily complementary) approaches regarding the actual role of 
ideology in motivating future perpetrators of mass murder: (1) the classical, perennial 
rational choice theory, and (2) the theory of ”utopianism”2. Concerning the ideological 
content of killings in genocidal fashion, ”utopianism” provides a rather philosophical 
device in studying the matter of the perpetrator’s motivation. Ideology exercises a 
multifold motivational functionality: for one, it tells a ”story” of Manichaeism, in 
which the targeted group is depicted as the historical enemy, to be encumbered once 
and for all. Secondly, it designs the portrait of the ”new men”, out of whom the future 
perpetrator will be selected, surely not in terms of killing3 (the attribute of ”killer” 
remains a strong word independent of the spirit of the epoch in which the genocide 
is to occur, being morally sanctioned by the society at least at the rhetorical-discursive 
level), but according to an ideal of vitality, activeness, youth, virility, spontaneity, 
strength, dynamism, expansionism, independence, of exacerbated desire to fight (in 
1 After all, democracy offers countless forms of observance, protection and promotion 
of minority groups, developing more than the simple antagonism between the majority 
(generically, the ”demos”) and the minority at the level of decision-making. Hence, what 
Mann seems to neglect is the fact that, although clearly dominated by all types of majorities – 
including, most importantly, ethnically and nationally associated ones –, the minorities are not 
completely defenseless in a democracy; though democracy is founded, procedurally, on the 
”will of the majority”, the complete semantic overlapping between the ”demos” and the ”natio” 
– a synonymy that was consecrated in exemplary France of 1789, to be afterwards considered 
the epitome of ”contractual nationalism” (Brian C.J. SINGER, ”Cultural versus Contractual 
Nations: Rethinking Their Opposition”, History and Theory, vol. 35, no. 3, October 1996, 
pp. 309-337) – is obsolete in the contemporary, liberal democracy. In contemporaneity, after the 
terrible experiences of fascism and communism, the general conception about democracy has 
definitely suffered a series of transformations: the accent falls on the virtues of liberty, rather 
than on the benefits of equality, ”demos” is detachedly perceived in respect to the ”natio”, due 
to the clear distinction between ”polity” and ”society” (multiculturalism, for instance, becomes 
rather a matter of freedom, the result of the many liberties and responsibilities an individual 
can fully exercise, instead of a difficult reality asking for group-differentiated rights, equality 
among ethnicity, etc.). Mann misses the point of a changing conception on democracy stressing 
not necessarily on majorities, but rather on the freedom of the individual citizen; mass killing-
associated acts are less prone to occur in a contemporary democracy.
2 A brief discussion of the two ”schools” in the study of mass murder is produced in 
Manus I. MIDLARSKY, The Killing Trap. Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (UK) & New York, 2005, pp. 64-81.
3 It is easily observable and, eventually, commonsensical that the channels conveying 
the ideology leading to genocide never employ the appellative of ”killer”, but ”fighter”, 
”fatherland’s defender”, ”protector of the nation”, ”bearer of purifying mission”, etc., hence 
diffusing the content of the act per se and, subsequently, its responsibility.
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effect, to exterminate, since the one against whom the perpetrator presumably fights 
is left with no means to fight back and defend himself). Thirdly, these abilities should 
be pondered by a sense of duty and sacrifice that might be better expressed in the 
annihilation of the enemy, as a mission owed to the ”nation”/the dominant group. 
It is necessary to notice that ideology does not simply brainwash individuals to 
miraculously metamorphosize them into killing machines; rather it employs inherent 
weaknesses (not necessarily psychological ones, but socio-economic, cultural1 and 
political ones) in order to allegedly transform them into potentialities, i.e. murderous 
potentialities. One can wonder, for course, whether the one putting into place a 
more or less coherent, though total and significantly mobilizing, ideology might be 
scrutinized as an ”ideological perpetrator”, intentionally disseminating a set of ideas 
and perspectives that is prone – actually, is intended, is desired – to produce the 
slaughter of the vulnerable minority group by the dominant one.
The ”authorization” – ”routinization” – ”dehumanization” scheme might 
provide some partial answers, some starting points for Chirot’s legitimate, perennial 
interrogations: 
 ”How do feelings get hardened? How is it that so many can be found to 
commit mass murder? What are the psychological mechanisms that overcome 
the horror most people feel when confronted by such spectacles?”.
Chirot and McCauley add to the mechanism described above other motivational 
stimuli and impulses – intense fear, anger, hate, the sense of humiliation and 
frustration, the desire for revenge, the potentiated sense of duty, training and good 
organization, etc. –, in order to conclude that ”it is not so difficult to explain why 
this [i.e. mass political murder] happens” and that ”many normal individuals can 
quite easily be turned into brutal killers”2. Though the conclusions drawn by the two 
American scholars are unfortunately pertinent and correct, they themselves find that 
the transformation from ”ordinary people” to ”butchers” should be contextualized, 
circumscribed to specific cases (their insistence is, expectedly, on the Holocaust). In 
this sense, one of the most compelling addenda to the existing ”motivational” model 
of the perpetrator the two historians provide is a peculiar process that can be coined 
as the ”ritualization” of killing: following Paul Rozin’s contention that humans 
confront generally a feeling of total disgust in the face of anything that is reminiscent 
to their animality, from birth to death, and consequently they proceed at imagining 
and constructing rituals around them for neutralizing the memory of the animal 
nature and the initial repelling sentiment3, Chirot and McCauley argue that some 
sort of accompanying ritual and preparatory procedures were designed to reduce 
the discomfort and the repugnancy of the gesture for the individual-turned-killer. 
1 When adding ”cultural weaknesses”, the present paper takes into consideration the 
recently espoused, still increasingly dangerous, theory of ”cultural relativism” or cultural 
differentiation and hierarchization. For a short introduction in the implications of a problematic 
concept, see Adamantia POLLIS, ”Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2, May 1996, pp. 316-344.
2 Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., p. 52.
3 Paul ROZIN, Jonathan HAIDT, Clark McCAULEY, ”Disgust”, in Michael LEWIS, 
Jeanette M. HAVILAND-JONES (eds.), Handbook of Emotions, Guilford Press, New York, 2000, 
pp. 637-653.
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Their contribution is particularly remarkable in respect to the nature of the reciprocity 
principle and the legitimacy of the kill. Hence, while it becomes natural for humans to 
react according to a reciprocity instance (from an axiological point of view, good deeds 
are responded to with good deeds, and conversely), murders in genocidal events 
happen usually outside the logic of this ”categorical imperative”, when helpless, 
defenseless and innocent victims are killed by angered perpetrators, infused with 
hatred, whose victims had not caused them any significant personal harm. Thus, 
the logic of reciprocity could only be twisted and deliberately inverted, deviated, 
in order to serve the purposes of the act per se. The kill becomes legitimate, since it 
is conceived as a form of reciprocity, carried out not against an innocent victim, but 
against a virtual enemy, propagandistically perceived as powerful, diligently working 
for the destruction of the perpetrator’s nation, racial purity, familial equilibrium and 
integrity, socio-economic wellbeing, personal security, etc. What results from this, a 
posteriori of a scapegoating, is the legitimation of murderous acts on the basis of the 
reciprocity principle in reference to a terribly dangerous enemy (the future victim 
of the genocide), one that has constantly undermined the existence of the would-be 
perpetrator. If such a logic fails to be put into place by the leading perpetrator, by 
the ideologist, by the decision-maker, the reciprocity scaffolding licensing the killing 
cannot generate the turning of ordinary people into coldhearted assassins1 and it 
becomes highly questionable to the masses to mobilize. The perpetrator mobilizing 
these masses is concerned with maintaining the inter-group fear and antagonism, but 
also the disproportionate prominence of a group over the other(s), a situation which 
would favor the unleashing of violence of the prominent group against the other. He 
has to construct the cronotop, the context, the locus in which killing is acceptable, 
with the destruction of the future perpetrator by the future victim being perceived as 
imminent. The reciprocity principle is inverted in an unusual form of ”preemptive 
strike”, in which fear acts as the principle mobilizing factor in the killing drive.
Christopher Browning’s inspiring study appears of paramount significance when 
inquiring into the logic of the perpetrator in genocide-like events. His functionalist 
Ordinary Men2 is a demonstration of how individuals outside the immediate circle of 
power and decision-making can actually participate actively in the genocidal process. 
Browning provides both an accurate and painful application of the psychological 
model and an exemplification of Rozin’s ”ritualization” of killing, by storing about 
the alcohol abuse specific to the Nazi killers, practiced in order to overcome the mental 
burden of the slaughters and their imprinted image. Moreover, it is interesting the fact 
that massive killings in Ukraine and the Baltic regions, leading to the extermination 
of 90% of the Latvian and Lithuanian Jews and of about 60% of the Ukrainian Jews3 
were carried out extensively by the locals – Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians –, 
1 After revising the present text, the phrasing ”coldhearted assassin” appeared 
inappropriate in faithfully describing the actual process of turning simple men and women into 
killers in the context of a genocidal endeavor. Rather, it appears from the literature (Browning, 
Chirot, Valentino, Sémelin, Jones, etc.) that the future perpetrators at the lower level of the 
terrible pyramid have had their hearts and psyche infused with hatred, anger, disgust at the 
sight of their victims. They were virtually hypnotized by a ”hot” ideology.
2 Christopher BROWNING, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution 
in Poland, HarperCollins, New York, 1992, pp. 52, 80, 163.
3 Lucy S. DAWIDOWICZ, The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
New York, 1975, p. 403.
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who were themselves imbued with alcohol and constantly threatened with their 
lives: it was perceived that local perpetrators can perform killings of their fellow 
inhabitants or neighbors more efficiently, bearing the pieces of information regarding 
the Jewish population of the targeted regions. What Browning advances is the theory 
of ”peer pressure” as foundational for the drive to kill among ordinary people. In a 
crowded situation – commonplace in times of extreme violence –, individuals who 
are supposed to kill but refuse to do so or protest against killing are prone to face 
the victim’s fatal fate. But other, milder, non-violent forms of peer pressure might 
count as well in the motivational equation of genocide and mass killing: Sémelin 
identifies ”the fear of being rejected by the group and, in a broader sense, of being 
ostracized by society”1 for those unwilling to commit murder of the ”enemies”. The 
fear of shunning and anathematization by the group can work as mobilizing factors 
to become involved in the killing, acknowledging the fact that in times of warfare and 
generalized violence the individual can survive more safely only within his dominant 
group, able to offer protection and security, if only by initiating and conducting 
killings against the perceived enemy. Browning’s remarkable observations are to be 
easily extended to other notorious cases of genocide: in Rwanda, in the majority of 
cases, the perpetrators were ordinary people ventured to kill their neighbors, their 
fellow villagers. The chief organizers of massacres were mayors or local officials, the 
Hutu gangs, formed immediately after the 6th of April, were composed of youngsters 
and adult males, themselves ordinary people with only scarce knowledge of using a 
rifle, for instance. The ”interahamwe”, the Hutu genocidal militia, frequently exerted 
exactly what Browning described as ”peer pressure”. The large scale usage of machetes 
demonstrates once more the blunt fact that the killers were ordinary individuals, 
commoners. In Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the perpetrators were largely Serbian 
soldiers of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), but also members of the militias of 
Serbian factions operating within the three countries (e.g. Army of Republika Srpska 
in Bosnia, Army of Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia, Kosovo Liberation Army); on 
the other hand, Milan Babić and Milan Martić in Croatia, Ratko Mladić and Radovan 
Karadžić in Bosnia were top decision-makers and army men, perpetrators belonging 
to the high echelons, to be subsequently trialed by the ad hoc established International 
Tribunal. Browning’s magnum opus is instrumental as well in illustrating the process 
of diffusing the very burden of killing and the responsibility for the murders, since 
collective responsibility or collective guilt are irrelevant for the customary legal 
practice and cannot be subsequently prosecuted. Since up to 10-15% of the men in 
Ordinary Men did disobeyed orders to kill, the ”peer pressure” coupled by a sense 
of ”authorization” can, Browning himself shows, be overcome by disobeying the 
murderous orders, by openly admitting the personal ”weakness” the individual 
carries with him, in effect the intrinsic ”sensitivity” to human suffering which is 
perceived as lack of strength by his peers (in fact, individual autonomy and powerful 
personality, free from orders and authority that usually transform commoners into 
killers). Imprinted with the stigmata of humiliation in front of the peers, the disclosure 
of personal ”weakness” at the face of human killing, of sheer ”cowardice”, remains 
quite dangerous for the very existence of the one thusly refusing to commit murder: 
Browning’s ”peer pressure” or Sémelin’s ”group conformity” (or, generally, some 
1 Jacques SÉMELIN, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide, transl. 
by Cynthia Schoch, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, p. 262.
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twisted form of ”l’esprit de corps”, some viral camaraderie into killing) does indeed 
have a quite powerful motivational significance in the transitional process from 
”ordinary men into butchers”.
For the specific case of the Holocaust, one can contend that this type of camaraderie 
among men willing to kill was inherited from the traumatic experience of the ”Great 
War”, an experience that marked the existence of an entire generation, justifiably 
perceived as a ”lost”, exhausted one. Studies on the membership of extreme groups 
and militias helping the ”effort” of exterminating Jews en masse showed that these 
organizations were composed of a large proportion of World War I veterans, bearing 
a previous experience in targeting and killing the enemy (though it should be stressed 
that this experience is one of fighting against a more or less, surely armed, enemy, not 
one of sheer extermination of a defenseless ”enemy”), but also viciously caught within 
a post-war society that offered too little to the former soldiers. Profoundly infuriated by 
having fought in a war whose stakes remained largely beyond their direct interests and 
comprehension, increasingly disenchanted with a instable democracy and a lagging 
economy, mobilized and energized by a ”hot” ideology, propagandistically asking for 
their support in furthering radical, overarching societal and political change, angered 
by what they came to perceived as the dangerous influence and role of the ”enemy 
from within” (undermining national prominence and pride, national economy and 
development, national purity, etc.), easily and comprehensively organized by an 
authoritarian regime that somehow resonated with their primary grievances and 
claims, the generation of soldiers of the First World War sadly reconfigured itself into 
the chief perpetrators of the Jewish population during the Second World War1. The 
conjecture that a ”history of aggression”, i.e. past experiences of widespread violence 
(e.g. the previous experience of war, a political culture encapsulating violence as one 
of chief traits, etc.), is conducive to more, exacerbated violence or, at least, makes 
violence normal, more acceptable, is validated by the Turkish case, as well as in the 
situation of the Cambodian2 and Rwandan3 genocides4. Surely, in times of war or in 
the period immediately following the war, desperate measures are permissible for 
1 For an interesting perspective on the role of World War I veterans in the Holocaust, see 
Leonard S. NEWMAN, Ralph ERBER (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the 
Holocaust, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 2002, especially p. 18. 
2 David P. CHANDLER, A History of Cambodia, Westview, Boulder (Colorado), 1983. 
3 Alison des FORGES, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 1999.
4 The same applies to Latin America (especially Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, etc.), where the reality of ”los desaparecidos”, killed in the Operation ”Condor” and 
during the ”Guerra Sucia”, is swept under the rug and not referred to as ”genocide” (due to the 
unfair rules of a ”reforma pactada” (Juan J. LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, the Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore & London, 1996, p. 356), of a negotiated transition to democracy that 
proclaimed ”forgive, but not forget” for the perpetrators and victims, respectively, during the 
defunct bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes). Naturally, no official condemnation as ”genocide” 
of the gross breaching of basic human rights practiced during the ancien régime was made by 
the successor, transitional governments, since accusations of ”genocide” and ”crimes against 
humanity” have to be prosecuted. See, for the state of violence in Latin America, Ervin STAUB, 
The Roots of Evil, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989.
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the security of the nation and the ”fatherland”1. The special situation of war seems 
to explain and excuse every action of both the military and the civilian population, 
even killing of groups found on a defenseless position, with no leverage to counter 
violence deployed against them. Needless to say that the youth of perpetrators counts 
significantly in the process of intentionally exterminating a group/population, since 
the high echelons of perpetrators can profit from the strength, vitality, willingness of 
such individuals forming the lower echelons, previously energized by an extreme 
ideology, conveniently appealing to their age and state of mind.
Another way to go in the explanation of the transition from ordinary man to 
brutal killer is famously referred to as the ”dissonance theory”. Briefly discussed by 
Chirot and McCauley, the theory has its origins in the psychological studies of John 
Sabini2 and explains the said transition in terms of the coherence between attitudes 
and beliefs and behavior: in order to reduce the incoherence between positive, moral, 
”Christian” beliefs and reprehensible behavior, to decrease the level of psychological 
dissonance, thusly to excuse the behavior and to reduce responsibility for the act 
of killing, the perpetrator – even in the presence of an excusing external pressure 
– ventures in a process of changing beliefs and attitudes in order to justify and 
pardon his acts. Dissonance theory – explaining such attitudes as the killing, abuses, 
torture practiced with ”for their own good”-type of excuse – introduces another 
form of distorted, inversed logic in the mind of the killer: the behavior does not 
follow the attitude, but the attitude is changed by the behavior. The attitude and the 
perceptions suffer mutations in order for the killer to find means to excuse himself 
and to maintain his self-image as decent, moral individual. Once the first killing is 
rationalized, justified somehow and the initial attitude is gradually changing – Chirot 
and McCauley perceptively observe – the excuses multiply countlessly, paving the 
way to numerous other murders, to ”routinization”: ”I have been ordered to do this; 
those being killed are doing something wrong; they stand in my way; they deserve it; 
they are a threat to my own people; they are not quite human; they are polluting”3, I 
was not properly informed, I did not know; they would have died anyway, probably 
in a more torturous and painful manner, etc. Any remorse or the possibility for the 
perpetrator to identify himself with the victim in the reciprocity circularity are thusly 
eliminated almost completely.
Arendt4 and Bauman are prominent in arguing that modernity – along with its 
alienation of daily life and with the unprecedented development of technical and 
technological drive – is the only era to foster the genocide, i.e. the intentional attempt 
to totally exterminate a group seen by the perpetrator as otherness from an ethnic, 
national, racial, religious, gender, political, social or whatever standpoint. The genocide 
is uniquely modern5 because it aims at totality; in this scheme, the perpetrator himself 
appears in a different light. Bauman develops: 
1 The importance of war, as catalyst for unleashing violence and for making mass killing 
acceptable is discussed in Mark MAZOVER, ”Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century”, 
The American Historical Review, vol. 107, no. 4, October 2002, pp. 1158-1178. 
2 John SABINI, Social Psychology, W.W. Norton, New York, 1995.
3 Daniel CHIROT, Clark McCAULEY, Why Not Kill Them All…cit., p. 56.
4 Hannah ARENDT, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, revised and 
enlarged ed., Viking, New York, 1964.
5 See Eric D. WEITZ, ”The Modernity of Genocides: War, Race, and Revolution in the 
Twentieth Century”, in Robert GELLATELY, Ben KIERNAN (eds.), The Specter of Genocide. Mass 
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 ”Modern civilization was not the Holocaust’s sufficient condition; it was, 
however, most certainly its necessary condition. Without it, the Holocaust would 
be unthinkable. It was the rational world of modern civilization that made the 
Holocaust thinkable. The Nazi mass murder of the European Jewry was not only 
the technological achievement of an industrial society, but also the organizational 
achievement of a bureaucratic society”1.
Therefore, what the Polish-born sociologist suggests is that either routinization 
or authorization is insufficient in explaining the final stage of ”dehumanization” 
in the perpetrator’s psychological evolution if both of the two explanatory paths 
are lacking the overall context in which they are to take place and be concurrently 
described: modernity itself. It is modernity to create and reshape the rationale of 
ethnic differentiation and discrimination among groups on national, racial, religious 
or socio-political lines; it is modernity to consecrate the slogan of ”To each nation, a 
state; to each state, a national being” and it is with the 20th century that the nationalist 
ideology diverted from a liberal-democratic, liberating message to a deviant 
xenophobic, racial, chauvinist, hatred-like, resentment-styled, eminently ethnic-
collectivist case. It is in the setting of a ”solid” modernity, with fixed structures (e.g. 
the nation-state) and pillarized societies, that mass killing managed to be put into 
play. No wonder that – Bauman carries on – the European Jewry became the target 
of the most extensive and debated-upon genocide, since it represented free-floating, 
”pan-European” nuclei of cosmopolitanism and ”liquid” modernity, running counter 
the trend of rigid, structuralized nation-states, of exact and often Manichean-ly 
dichotomous differentiations. It is in the same all-encompassing logic of the ”solid” 
modernity of the 20th century that the modern state joined with science and its latest 
fulfillments in order to serve the horrifying purpose of genocide: science provided, 
Bauman will contend, the rationale in accordance with which the modern state 
would find it suitable and beneficial to ”weed out [those] elements detrimental to 
’the vision of good society, a healthy society, an orderly society’”2, those elements 
that would impoverish, sicken and, eventually, destroy the “nation” of the pure ones3. 
Interpreting the Holocaust – as the paradigmatic genocide and as a lived experience 
Murder in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York, 2003, 
pp. 53-74.
1 Zygmunt BAUMAN, Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 13.
2 IDEM, Modernity and Ambivalence, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 29.
3 There is no surprise that Bauman, having lived the experience of the Holocaust and 
of the interwar ”solid modernity” of the modern (nation-)state, would find the virtues of 
postmodernism as exemplary for the new, ”liquid”, particularly relativistic, multicultural 
and cosmopolite, modernity he envisaged in his writings. Constructing on the renowned 
contributions of Freud, Kafka and Simmel, Bauman will conclude that each of them constituted 
a landmark to the path of post-modernity: ”[P]sychoanalysis transformed the human world […] 
into a text to be interpreted […] By asking questions, it sapped the structure whose substance 
was the prohibition of asking […] [Kafka’s] namelessness precedes, and ushers into, the modern 
world; one in which names are not received but made, and, while being made, fail to offer a 
fixed date and a settled place and abrogate the very hope of such an offer […] [S]ociology had 
no room for ’society’; Simmel was after the mystery of sociality. Simmel’s sociology is about the 
art of building – rather than grand, harmony-conscious, architectural designs” (Ibidem, pp. 175, 
184, 187 [italics in original]).
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for Bauman –, the Polish sociologist argues that the ”marginality” of the European 
Jewry, displayed and understood as ”modernity’s feet of clay” favored the targeting 
of this particular group and the outburst of death and uncertainty in the genocidal 
drive of the late modernity: 
 ”Death was an emphatic denial of everything that the brave new world of 
modernity stood for, and above all of its arrogant promise of the indivisible 
sovereignty of reason. The moment it ceased to be ‘tame’, death has become 
a guilty secret; literally, a skeleton in the cupboard left in the neat, orderly, 
functional and pleasing home modernity promised to build”1.
Not surprisingly, Bauman aligns to the never-ending row of scholars postulating 
axiomatically the exhaustive failure of ”reason” – as conceptualized and centralized 
by modern philosophy – and the most clear-cut illustration of this epochal failure in 
the occurrence of Holocaust and in the genocides and mass killings that subsequently 
happened in the second half of the 20th century. Reading Bauman, the ”terrible” century 
– started in distant Africa, with the German extermination of Hereros, and ended 
in the Balkans and in Darfur – can be explained sociologically and psychologically 
only from the prism of the exhaustion of a late, ”solid” modernity that exerted a 
complete, all-encompassing alienation on the human physic and spirit. The modern 
individual appears caught in a pressing, continuously demanding society, he is 
exposed as alienated by a highly industrialized, highly developed nation-state, in the 
logic of which he customarily thinks; he constructs his reality in the context of a ”solid 
modernity”, according to the challenges posed by a polarized nation-state: 
 ”[M]odernity appears to be a continuous yet ultimately inconclusive drive 
towards rational order free from contingency, accidents, things that can get ’out 
of hand’. It is to maintain such an artificial order, forever precarious and always 
stopping short of its ideal, that modernity needed enormous quantities of energy 
the animate sources could not possibly supply”2.
Add to this the fears, frustrations and the alleged threats of a propagandistically 
constructed ”enemy from within” or of ”the foreigner inside”3. Such an artificially 
maintained scenario would appear to Bauman quite favorable to the relapse of the 
individual into killing the other. Therefore, the ”energies” of modernity necessary 
to sustain its artificial construct eventually erupted to produce massive human loss. 
The observations drawn by the author of Liquid Modernity seem compatible to the 
concluding remarks of French historians Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, in their 
History of the Private Life: 
1 IDEM, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, 
p. 134.
2 IDEM, Postmodern Ethics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993, p. 211.
3 For the usage of the two collocations in the specific discussion of mass political killing 
(on ethnic, racial, religious or national grounds), see Rémi SAVARD, ”L’étranger venu d’ici”, in 
Simon HAREL (ed.), L’étranger dans tous ses états. Enjeux culturels et littéraires”, XYZ, Montréal, 
1992, pp. 99-102.
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 ”The one born at the beginning of the century, whose conscious life covers 
our entire period (he or she would have had fourteen years old at the beginning 
of the First World War), what could he or she have possibly seen? The Massacres 
of 1914-1917, the Russian Revolution, Hitler and the Auschwitz camp, Stalin 
and the gulag, Hiroshima, Mao Tse-Tung and the cultural revolution, Pol Pot 
and the Cambodian genocide, the drift of Latin America with its bloodthirsty 
caudillos and its disappearances, the famished Africa, the Islamic Revolution 
and the reinstalment of the Islamic canonic law. But Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol 
Pot could not have done anything if the mimetism had not generated numerous 
look-alikes at small scale”1.
Their enumeration of awful episodes recorded by a bloody recent history is 
instrumental in the analysis of both the failure of ”modern” reason and the mutations 
this failure generated on the individual, in explaining the latter’s willingness to be 
part in genocidal episodes, ultimately to kill. Indeed, the man born in the first years 
of the 20th century witnessed or, more clearly, was historically contemporaneous 
with the first ”modern” attempt to complete annihilation in the case of the Hereros 
by the Germans in South-West Africa in 1904, with the Armenian Genocide by the 
Young Turks, between 1915 and 1923, with the Ukrainian Holodomor by the Soviets 
in 1932-1933 and subsequent massive deportations in Siberia practiced by the Soviets, 
with the Holocaust under the command of Nazi Germany in the period 1939-1945, 
with the mass murder of about half a million people in Indonesia in 1965-1966, with 
the genocides in Bangladesh of 1971, in Burundi of 1972, in Cambodia of 1975-1979, 
perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, in East Timor of 1975-1979, in Rwanda of 1994, in 
former Yugoslavia of 1991-1995 and 1995-1999. It seemed that genocide and mass 
killing were the spirit of the epoch and a large proportion of the globe’s population 
got caught in this spirit and its murderous and ignoble manifestations.
Either contextualized and circumscribed by an alienating and exhausting late 
modernity or shaped according to an explanatory progressive model of ”authorization” 
– ”routinization” – ”dehumanization”, the image of the perpetrator of genocidal acts 
or mass political killing viciously pendulates between moral-judgemental stances 
(altered self-consciousness) and psychological, rational-choice oriented perspectives. 
Surfing around that image as it is developed in countless, more or less accurate, artistic 
emanations, one should pause a while on the vivid and illuminating description of 
Hanna Schmitz, delivered in Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader. Disturbing as it may 
arouse, the portrait of a woman working as an SS guard, serving in Auschwitz until 
early 1944 and being found guilty of refusing to open the gates of a church in fire filled 
with people of Jewish origins is illustrative for the analysis of the perpetrator’s psyche 
and his motivational mosaic2. Somehow opposable, the portrait Arendt depicts in her 
1 Philippe ARIÈS, Georges DUBY, History of the Private Life, vol. 5 Riddles of Identity in 
Modern Times, Antoine Prost, Gérard Vincent (eds.), Arthur Goldhammer (transl.), Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1992-1998, p. 377 (initially published as Histoire 
de la vie privée, 5 volumes, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1985-1987).
2 What is contingently (i.e. keeping the proportion of an otherwise mediocre literary, 
fictional emanation) illustrated in Bernhard SCHLINK, The Reader (Der Vorleser, Diogenes 
Verlag, Zürich, 1995) is comprehensively explained in Jon ELSTER, ”Retribution”, in Jon 
ELSTER (ed.), Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 33-56, under the form of counterfactuals (e.g. ”if I hadn’t done it, 
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famous Eichmann at Jerusalem uncovers the variant of the bureaucrat as perpetrator: 
Eichmann is, Arendt postulates, the indubitable expression of the ”banality of evil”. 
Perfectly inserted in the setting of a state conducting, sponsoring and coordinating 
the killing of a group living on its territory – a state that developed an administration 
conducive to its murderous purposes –, the bureaucrat is the one issuing the 
administrative death of the targeted group. By no means a simple pawn, allegedly 
incapable of independently thinking outside the administrative mechanisms of the 
officialdom, the bureaucrat in a perpetrator state is himself caught in a more subtle 
form of ”authorization”, working under the supervision of and according to the high 
echelons of authority. As Saul Friedländer famously observed: 
 ”The bureaucratic machinery is the most efficient instrument of totalitarian 
power and terror; bureaucracy with its banal servants whose only ambition is to 
fulfill their task as efficiently as possible; bureaucracy which, once set in motion, can 
lead from the most elementary identification measures to total extermination”1.
Though the insistence in the literature has been so far on the ordinary killer 
in the Holocaust – most probably due to its magnitude, its pretence to totality, the 
diversity of methods deployed and employed to annihilate the European Jewry, etc. 
–, one should not overlook and neglect the inquiry into the perpetrator’s rationale 
and motivations involved in the most recent genocides. Hence, while the laborious 
sociological explanations in Arendt, Adorno and Bauman regarding the alienation of 
the modern world and its exercise upon the human individual might provide a hint 
in accounting for the preliminary steps of transforming ordinary men into killers, for 
the climate, the mood leading to the Holocaust, these explanations become futile in 
surveying the image of the perpetrator in Rwanda or the in Balkans. The pressure 
exerted by the modern life, the unimaginable development of industrial realm, the 
essentialized modern cultural evolution have no relevant explanatory force for the 
construction of the context and the events in 1994’ Rwanda and in late 1990s in Bosnia. 
Even abandoning the logic of backwardness – by now an essentially obsolete one –, 
it appears commonsensical to observe that the settings and the societies mentioned 
above did not reach an exhaustion of modernity, being marked actually by modernity 
in its infancy. Thus, the perpetrator in the Holocaust is clearly differently motivated 
as compared to the one in Rwanda or Bosnia. Indeed, what all these events have in 
somebody else would have”; ”if I has stepped down, somebody else, worse than me, would 
have taken my place”; ”if we hadn’t been rigorous in repressing opposition, the Soviets would 
have intervened, with much worse results”; ”if I had refused to do it, I would have been killed”; 
the futility counterfactual excuses; the ”mens rea” excuse, etc.). 
1 Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, ”From Anti-Semitism to Extermination…cit.”, 14. The insistence 
on the bureaucratic perpetrator is central to Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, 
Quandrangle Books, Chicago, 1961, but Friedländer mentions in this respect Christopher R. 
BROWNING, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung 
Deutschland 1940-43, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1978, and Joseph WALK, Das Sonderrecht 
für die Juden im NS-Staat. Eine Sammlung der geszetzlichen Massnahmen und Richtlinien – Inhalt 
und Bedeutung, C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg, 1981. For instance, Walk counts 
approximately 2000 decrees and ordinances regarding the German Jewish population between 
1937-February 1945. The recent genocides would gradually lose this sophisticated, bureaucratic 
facet.
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common is a statist authoritarian context, i.e. genocides (understood as an appanage of 
modernity) are foreign to democracy, being associated, as a rule, with authoritarianism 
and autocracy. Infused with hatred and prejudice, the individual in an unfree regime, 
oriented towards acts of violence against minorities, lives according to and adopts a 
certain set of institutional and cultural practices, a specific type of political culture, he 
internalizes a series of socio-political orientations. This is not to assume that the citizen 
(euphemistically referred to) in an authoritarian rule is generally inclined towards 
acts of violence against various minority groups within the society; nevertheless, 
it becomes apparent that, living in an atmosphere of unleashing arbitrary violence 
against groups treated as inferior by the state and coordinating harsh discriminatory 
propaganda would undoubtedly have an imprint on the existence and perspective of 
the ordinary citizen. On the other hand, the authoritarian, i.e. unfree, framework, the 
illiberal setting is only ”the means of destruction, not its basic explanation”1. Historical 
experience proved, repeatedly demonstrated that, even though democracy might 
appear internally, intrinsically incompatible to genocidal acts, democracy indeed 
helped authoritarian governments to foster mass killing undertakings2.
Psychological complexities of the human being as a violent entity par excellence 
constitute an intriguing and interesting lecture. Aside from the pleasure of reading, 
one cannot explain the occurrence of genocide and of related forms of mass killing by 
the simple reference to humanly immanent ”mortal terror”, for instance. The present 
paper focuses on the individual perpetrator, but psychological accounts abound 
in respect to ”collectivities as perpetrators” as well3. It is hazardous and reckless 
to conclude that contemporary human history is the expression of natural, near-
animal instincts, manifested at the fullest, though the case of Rwanda, for example, 
might appear thusly explainable. Mann gives compelling hints in respect to the 
larger picture of perpetuating mass killing in the modern age, an epoch in which 
the killer is not psycho-biologically bound of a basic feeling, but his motivational 
spectrum and his rationality form an inextricable construction, including: material 
and careerist motivations or bigot and ideological reasoning. Sémelin, as well, 
1 Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, ”From Anti-Semitism to Extermination…cit.”, p. 16, with the 
mention that the historian referred specifically to the ”totalitarian paradigm” explaining the 
extermination of the Jewish population.
2 It is the case of the United States which, under the Cold War rationale, supported the 
”bureaucratic-authoritarian” regime in Latin America, those regimes sadly famous for their 
huge number of ”desaparecidos”. See, in this respect, David W. DENT (ed.), U.S. – Latin American 
Policymaking. A Reference Handbook, Greenwood Publishing, Westport (Connecticut), 1995, 
pp. 397-500. It wasn’t the first time when the North American democracy – through its Central 
Intelligence Agency – escaped from prosecution high-ranked perpetrators of genocide: after 
the conclusion of war, the high echelons of Nazi German bureaucracy were helped to reach U.S. 
(See Christopher SIMPSON, The Splendid Blonde Beast. Money, Law, and Genocide in the Twentieth 
Century, Grove Press, New York, 1993).
3 The book of French sociologist and journalist Gustave Le BON, La Psychologie des Foules, 
Felix Alcan, Paris, 1896 [transl. into English as The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, N.S. 
Berg, Dunwoody (Georgia), 1968] is notorious in this perspective, by arguing that groups are 
intrinsically immature, egoistic, uncaring, and frequently they turn brutal and, even, sadistic. 
His theory seems anticipatory (or inspirational?) for the future ”peer pressure” hypothesis: ”By 
the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the 
ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual: in a crowd, he is a barbarian 
– that is, a creature acting by instinct” (p. 32).
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favors a multi-faceted approach – ”the tipping mechanism” – when dealing with the 
genocidal rationale and its motivational background, taking into consideration both 
”rationalization” and ”cognitive dissonance” theories, but also ”divine legitimation” 
conception and the ”crime of obedience”, and even the ”profiteering” dimensions of 
massacres and the ”socializing” role of violence. Chirot and McCauley acknowledge 
the contingencies of the biological- and social-psychological explanations and, as a 
consequence, stress on the importance of organization in carrying on a genocidal 
episode: indifferent of the motives that lead a man to kill and of the strength of these 
motives, without proper organization and sponsorship, such killings would remain 
singular, isolated murders. Genocide is, after all, ”death by government”1, though, 
indeed, executed by individuals. Basic feelings and reflex actions concluded in the 
outburst of extreme violence can only emerge in a certain conjuncture, when their 
manifestation is somehow encouraged and fostered by a political arrangement. Those 
ordinary people turned into perpetrators do not appear hazardously, accidentally, but 
they are the products of a specific type of political regime, an eminently authoritarian 
one; no wonder genocide is foreign to liberal democracy2. In addition, the motivational 
inextricabilities suffer changes as the study of the perpetrators oscillates up and 
down the hierarchical structure of decision-making: ideological motivations usually 
stand at the top, while materialistic and psychological rationales tend to become 
dominant at the bottom. For instance, in times of war, the higher representatives of 
local authority (including civilian administration) might appear as if they were acting 
hastily, in a disordered, unorganized fashion, the actions coordinated by them might 
have been hierarchically imposed on them from above, in an ”authorization” spin-
over. Therefore, their responsibility seems conveniently limited, no wonder they are, 
for example, conspicuously reluctant in signing an order of returning a Jew from 
his pathway to death in Iaşi3. Their posture generally reveals overwhelmed men in 
1 Rudolf Joseph RUMMEL, Death by Government, Transaction Publishers, Brunswick (New 
Jersey), 1994. Rummel referred to ”democide” as an umbrella term to cover “genocide, as well 
as politicide, mass murder” (IDEM, Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder, Transaction 
Publishers, Rutgers [New Jersey], 1992). Briefly, in this respect, the semantic imagination is 
fruitful and laudable: ”genocide” was divided by the recent scholarly into: ”cultural genocide” 
(”culturicide”) and ”ethnocide” (both used by Raphael Lemkin – Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: 
Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1944 – in 1944 and, most recently, by the ”UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” of 2007, but not clearly defined), ”linguicide”, 
”classicide” (concept used by Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., pp. 17 and 320), 
”gendercide” (coined by Mary Anne WARREN, in Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection, 
Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa (New Jersey), 1985, to include both ”femicide” and ”androcide”) 
”autogenocide” (employed for the Cambodian genocide, by Karl D. JACKSON (ed.), Cambodia, 
1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death, Princeton University Press, Princeton (New Jersey), 1989). 
For a partial corollary of the terminology, see George J. ANDREOPOULOS (ed.), Genocide: 
Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1994.
2 Rudolf J. RUMMEL, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick (New Jersey), 1997.
3 This type of attitude of the local authorities in times of genocide is beautifully and 
magistrally described in Radu Gabrea’s movie Gruber’s Journey (2008), remarkably depicting 
the days around the Iaşi pogrom, based on a loose adaptation of Curzio Malaparte’s Kaputt 
(Casella, Napoli, 1944). In Gruber’s Journey, the protagonist, Italian journalist and army captain 
Curzio Malaparte, is permanently said that the country in which he seeks a certain Jewish 
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physician is in war and, consequently, desperate measures are acceptable and required in such 
times. The representatives of the local authority, bearing responsibility for the killing in their 
city, are shown to hold attitudes subtly proving a common denominator (i.e. impatience, anxiety, 
cynicism), otherwise they manifest gradually (particularly towards an ill, disoriented, virtually 
narcotized foreigner, though technically a ”friend” of the nation, an Italian, an ally), from 
exaggerated politeness and obsequious condescension to escalated verbal aggressiveness and 
conspicuous nervousness. In front of the profoundly confused, though increasingly impatient 
Italian journalist, an unconvincing qui-pro-quo is played, while the high-ranked whom he meets 
tacitly agree that the best solution for camouflaging the realities of the pogrom (conscientiously 
washed up and cleaned in the front of the Police site) is what could be labeled as the ”politics 
of adjournment”, of postponement. When the impatience of the foreigner reaches the climax, 
”alternative” methods, evading the initial postulated orders that are breached and eventually 
disregarded. Therefore, in the implementation of fascist policies of discrimination and ethnic 
cleansing conducive to genocidal episodes, all these personnages (otherwise amusing, even 
laughable by their very ridicule posture, if the storyline and the circumstances were different) 
are mere ”authoritarian doers”; it becomes virtually irrelevant both for the movie and for the 
overall discussion about the Iaşi pogrom whether these high-ranked, though local (i.e. with 
local resources, with local implementation, with local rationale, subordinating them irreducibly 
and allegedly indisputably to the central authorities) administrators bore antisemitic sentiments 
or not: after all, they seemed humble, mere executors. Moreover, it is debatable to what extent 
these individuals were guided by anger and hate as political motivational incentives, rather 
than by a maniacal submission to rules and procedures, to orders and resolutions coming ”from 
above”, without the rational internalization, morally glanced, implications and repercussions 
of such infamous norms and decisions. There remained, of course, room for innovation, simply 
due to the precarious resources in dealing with the ”Jewish question”, particularly in Iaşi. The 
orders had to be fulfilled, but the fashion in doing so was puzzling for the local authorities, who 
resorted to provincial operations in order to cleanse the city of a significant number of Jews. 
Others were particularly imaginative (e.g. scapegoating the theft of the Roznovanu bottles of 
wine). Hence, what was eminently an exhaustive and demanding endeavor during the period 
was rather the imaginative process of pursuing with the crimes against the Jews, not necessarily 
the moral burden of the monstrous killings themselves. 
The movie presents its subtleties, it only allows for the historical event of the Iaşi pogrom 
to transpire from the banal story of approximately two days of Malaparte’s search for the Jewish 
doctor Josef Gruber. The ravages of the war are the sole conspicuous facet the city displays: 
the evidence of the killings are rapidly and poorly cleaned out, proving once more that the 
operation was unintentional and totally spontaneous. The death trains with its sealed wagons, 
out of which suggestive calls for help are heard, are guarded only by two soldiers, one of 
whom proves imperturbable in his observance and execution of received orders, similarly to 
Zimbardo’s ”strict, but fair” perpetrator’s type of behavior; therefore, the same unconscious, 
maladive, blinded, extremely dangerous attachment to the resolutions and orders received from 
above is to be reproduced up to the lowest levels of the administrative and military hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, the point which is probably unnecessarily repeatedly made is the bureaucratic 
shaw Malaparte undergoes and the insistence on the ad litteram observance of procedures 
and orders (These characteristics are to be perennial for the Romanian society, they are not 
differently operated with in the particular case of the Holocaust – or in the more particular 
one of the Iaşi pogrom –; the ”Caragialesque” scent that imbues them is not to be specific in 
whatever sense to the period 1940-1944). Matatias Carp, probably in a yet reductionist vein, 
argues in respect to the said event: ”Iaşi, the horrifying symbol of persecution, robbery and 
bloodbaths has no equivalent; Odessa, Golta, Katyn, Kiev, Maidanek, Auschwitz, Belsen, etc. 
could be listed as comparisons, but Iaşi preceded these by months or even years. If we were too 
look for parallels of sorts in the past we would have to turn back a large number of pages in 
the history books; we would have to take a giant leap back in time” (Matatias CARP, Holocaust 
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power, incapable or unwilling of providing records of their terrible implementations 
of genocidal policies. Partially abandoning purely psychological inquiries into the 
perpetrator’s mind, Manus I. Midlarsky, Professor of International Peace and Conflict 
Resolution at Rutgers University (New Jersey), develops an interesting, compelling 
structural theoretical framework in his attempt to answer the central question ”[H]
ow so many perpetrators could be induced (of their own will or otherwise) to commit 
mass murder”?1. The causal scheme the American scholar identifies starts from the 
historical reality of grave economic hardships in post-World War I Germany and it 
is extended to illustrate a general context of socio-economic difficulties, followed by 
immanent, increasingly vocal, popular grievances and disenchantment, at the societal 
level, and by conspicuous and deepening economic inequalities, at the social level. 
It is this economic inequality to generate not only the general context for the employ 
of violence, but also, most importantly, the easiness to unleash violence against the 
wealthy, educated, cosmopolite ”other”, once the socio-economic inequality translated 
into the inability of groups to identify with each other, into the absence of identification. 
Though the ”vulnerability in the minds” of ordinary men becoming perpetrators2 
is discussed as well, the problem of insurmountable socio-economic inequalities 
seems deprived of the immediate, facile (biological-)psychological postulates (even if 
determining other endless flow of psychological interpretations based on social class 
determinants). Moreover, the lessons taught by the 20th century’ genocides should 
attempt to provide an answer for the problematic questions Theodor Adorno raised 
in The Authoritarian Personality: 
in Romania. Facts and Documents on the Annihilation of Romania’s Jews, 1940-1944, ed. by Andrew 
L. Simon, Simon Publications, Safety Harbour [Florida], 2004, p. 79). One could only wonder, 
if the crimes against the Jews were perpetuated by months and years, how come the anxiety, 
impatience and ridicule displayed by the characters of Gabrea’s film?
It is significant to mention that, while vividly contested up to the moment in which physical 
evidence was publicly revealed (as the entire genocidal period of the Holocaust in Romania 
was), the Iaşi pogrom of June 1941 and that in Bucharest of January 1941 were present not 
only in Malaparte’s Kaputt, but in other witness accounts as well (e.g. Robert St. John’s Foreign 
Correspondent of 1957). They were nonetheless differently pictured and recounted. St. John’s 
account is quoted extensively in Ion C. BUTNARU, The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its Jews, 
Greenwood Press, Westport (Connecticut), 1992, p. xvii. Here, a more ideologically-imbued 
perspective is put forth, which would explain the ”righteous anger” of the perpetrators, as 
main feature of motivational scheme: he speaks of the doers as men ”exposed to the Christian 
precepts of humility, gentility and non-violence”, committing racially-motivated crimes ”with 
prayers on their lips and crosses and crucifixes in their hands or hanging around their necks”. 
No such account on the religious facet of the perpetrators is to be found in Malaparte who 
analyzes primarily the reaction of the officialdom.
1 Manus I. MIDLARSKY, The Killing Trap. Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (UK) & New York, 2005, p. 264. 
2 Refreshing hypotheses include: (1) the burden of killing eased by the sense of ”validation”, 
i.e. the acknowledgement of the fact that serious consequences for murder are absent, and (2) 
”continuity of killing”, i.e. prior experience with extreme violence or identification with the 
aims and purposes of specific episodes of mass murder or the acknowledgement of the fact that 
the targeted population has been previously subject of massacre, thus the acknowledgement of 
the victim’s vulnerability. (Manus I. MIDLARSKY, The Killing Trap…cit., pp. 43-63.) 
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 ”Today the world scarcely remembers the mechanized persecution and 
extermination of millions of human beings only a short span of years away, in 
what was once regarded as the bastion of Western civilization. Yet the conscience 
of many men was aroused. How could it be, they asked each other, that in a 
culture founded on right, order and reason, there should have survived the 
irrational vestiges of ancient religious and racial hatreds? How could they explain 
the willingness of great masses of individuals to tolerate the mass extermination 
of their fellow citizens? Which of the cells of the modern social body are still 
affected by this cancer and, in spite of our assumed enlightenment, show the 
incongruous atavism of ancient peoples? And what within the individual 
organism responds to certain stimuli in our culture with attitudes and acts of 
destructive aggression?”1.
The figure of the perpetrator, more than those of the victim and of the bystander, 
can irrefutably provide a more comprehensive compendium of answers and explanations 
for the treatment of genocide.
1 Theodor W. ADORNO et al., The Authoritarian Personality, Norton, New York & London, 
1982, p. vii.
